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Abstract
This paper proposes a game to study strategic communication on platforms by parties.
Parties’ platforms have been chosen in a multidimensional policy space, but are imperfectly
known by voters. Parties strategically decide the emphasis they put on the various issues, and
thus the precision of the information they convey to voters on their position on each issue.
The questions we address are the following: what are the equilibria of this communication
game? How many issues will they address? Will parties talk about the same issues or not?
Will they talk on issues that they "own" or not?
JEL: C70, D72
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1 Introduction
There is a long tradition in political science on ignorant ill-informed voters (e.g. Campbell et
al. 1960), emphasizing that voters have little incentive to invest by themselves time and effort
to gather all the relevant information about the stakes of elections. In this perspective, electoral
campaigns are perceived as important, since they may provide voters with the opportunity to learn
at low cost about the candidates’ personal characteristics, the parties’ platforms, and the stakes
of the election. But since campaigns are orchestrated by parties, it suggests that how much voters
learn about parties platforms is partly determined by parties themselves. Even if the candidates
do not ’lie’, they may have incentives to make some of this information hard to obtain for voters,
by making extremely vague and ambiguous statements for instance (Page 1978) or by avoiding to
address some issues.
So far, the key feature of the electoral campaign that has been the most studied in formal
models is the ’where to stand’ question, as in the standard spatial model of Downs (1957) or
Hotelling (1929) (see however the literature referred to below). But if parties strategically decide
the emphasis they put on the various issues and the precision of the information they convey
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on each issue, another key question is: ’what will they talk about?’ And this may prove to
be extremely important when voters mainly learn about the platforms through the campaign.
By deciding which issues they want to emphasize, parties will determine the quality of voters’
information, the dividing lines in the electorate and the issues on which the election will eventually
depend upon. The objective of this paper is precisely to analyze these decisions, in particular to
put forward some trade-offs faced by the parties when they convey information on their platforms.
We develop a game that parties - or candidates - may play once platforms have been chosen.
Since platforms have already been chosen, parties only care about their probability of winning the
election (or alternatively about the vote share they get) and choose their strategies accordingly.
These strategies are how much time candidates will spend during the campaign explaining their
position on each issue, possibly subject to some time/resource constraints. How these explanations
modify voters’ information is described below. At the end of the electoral campaign, voters vote
for the party they prefer.
The idea we want to capture here is that in the couple of weeks before an election, it may be
impossible for a candidate to adjust his platform the way he wished he could. For instance, this
platform may have been decided by the party and officially written in a manifesto. Due to poorly
informed voters, even though platforms are chosen, they is still a lot of room for the candidates
to be strategic, regarding the features of their platform they want to put special emphasis on.
When invited on a TV show, a candidate may want to speak mainly about law and order issues,
or mainly about economic issues, or on the contrary, avoid as much as possible such issues. We
assume that voters have a priori beliefs regarding where parties stand on the various issues. They
are ready to update these beliefs when they get new information from the campaign. The more a
candidate talks about an issue, the better-informed voters will be regarding his position on this
issue.
Our model captures what we believe are the three most important effects of speeches. Two
bear on voters. The third one bears on parties. First, a speech conveys information on where a
candidate truly stands, which may or may not be beneficial to a party Indeed, it it depends on
where the party stands relative to the average voter in the electorate. Second, a speech reduces
voters’ uncertainty about the party’s platform, which is unambiguously favorable to a party, as
soon as voters are risk-averse. This effect may explain why parties may both want to address a
same issue. The third effect is some ’strategic risk’ that a candidate undertakes when he tries to
explain his position. Indeed, speeches may however be understood differently by voters, which
introduces a source of uncertainty for parties explaining their positions. This strategic risk is
maximal when a party speaks on an issue but too little an amount of time to make clear enough
where it stands. Due to this effect, a party may refrain from speaking or, at the opposite, increase
his speech.
The questions we want to answer are the following: what are the equilibria of this communica-
tion game? How much information is transmitted to voters through the campaign? Will parties
talk about the same issues or not? Will they talk about issues on which they are close to the
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average voter or not? Because of the interactions of the three effects of a speech described above,
various types of equilibrium strategies can be obtained. We think that this new model shed some
light on previous puzzles. One such puzzle concerns "issue convergence". Petrocik (1996) argues
that each candidate enjoys an a priori advantage (’ownership’) on some issues. Viewing the elec-
tion as a two person zero sum game, no issue can work to the advantage of both candidates, and
opponents should address different ’orthogonal’ issues (Austen-Smith 1993, Simon 2002). And
thus one should observe no issue convergence (defined by the fact that both parties address the
same issues). This prediction is at odd with some empirical evidence (Sigelman and Buell 2004).
We propose a modified version on the this ownership theory that is consistent with those empirical
findings.
Related literature. The literature, both theoretical and empirical, on issue convergence will
be surveyed and discussed in section 6.4 in the light of our results. Besides, our paper is related
to several strands of literature.
Other models have studied the allocation of campaign resources in the presence of uninformed
voters. But those models make very different assumptions on the way campaign spending influ-
ence voters. In Brams and Morton (1974) or Baron (1994) for example, the probability that an
uninformed voter votes for the democratic party is the ratio between the amount of spending by
the democratic party over the total amount of spending by both parties. In Snyder (1989), some
asymmetry of the efficiency of spending across parties (and across districts) is introduced, but in
an ad hoc form that remains silent on the mechanisms which may generate this asymmetry. In this
paper on the contrary, we model a channel through which campaign spending affect uninformed
voters’ decisions, that is, through the information that is conveyed to voters about the parties’
platforms.
Our paper also relates to the literature that models an electoral campaign as a manipulation
game. As here parties have ’true’ platforms, which are imperfectly known by voters. A party’s
platform may be interpreted as its preferred policy, the one it will implement once in office.
Announcements serve to ’manipulate’ voters’ beliefs, and may be more or less effective in trans-
mitting information depending on voters’ reactions. No information is transmitted if the game is
pure cheap talk zero-sum game with strategic voters. Introducing some cost born by the winning
candidate not only makes communication possible but also induces a multiplicity of equilibria
(Banks 1990). Our game is not a cheap talk game since speaking always conveys information.
With respect to that literature, some distinctive modeling assumptions should be made precise.
The first feature concerns parties’ sincerity. During the campaign, candidates are assumed to be
truthful although voters may wrongly interpret their speeches. Specifically, parties’ speeches are
interpreted as noisy but unbiased signals about the parties’ true positions. A second important
feature, related to the previous one, is about commitment. Voters vote according to their as-
sessment about parties’ platforms. Hence, as in the standard spatial electoral competition game
(Downs 1957, Hotelling 1929), it is implicit that platforms will be implemented (or that deviations
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are due to unforeseen circumstances). Third, voters, although Bayesian, are not perfectly rational.
The sensitivity of our results to those modelling assumptions will be discussed in subsection 6.2.
Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 carefully analyzes the impact of the electoral cam-
paign on voters’ beliefs. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the analysis of equilibria, first in the case
where candidates face a time constraint per issue (section 4), and then when then face a global
time constraint (section 5). Section 6 provides a number of discussions about the model. First, a
counter-intuitive example shows that although only unbiased information is transmitted to voters
in the course of the campaign, campaign might be welfare reducing for voters.(subsection 6.1).
The assumptions of naïve voters and faithful parties are discussed (subsection 6.2). We briefly
introduce and discuss an alternative model of information transmission, where when addressing an
issue, a candidate not only conveys information to voters about where he stands on the issue, but
also information about where his opponent stands on the same issue (subsection 6.3).The link with
the theoretical and empirical literature on issue convergence is made in more detail (subsection
6.4). A last section concludes.
2 The electoral campaign model
We consider a multidimensional policy space, X = RK , where K is the number of a priori relevant
issues.
Voters and parties. Each voter is characterized by a bliss point x = (x1, x2, ..., xK) in X, and
by a vector of weights α = (α1, α2, ..., αK) ∈ RK+ describing how she weights the various issues
at stake. Her utility is represented by (the opposite of) a weighted distance to her bliss point:
if policy z = (z1, z2, ..., zK) ∈ X is implemented, a voter with a weight vector α and bliss point
x ∈ X gets the utility:
u(z;α, x) = −
X
k
αk
¡
zk − xk
¢2
.
The parameters (α, x) are distributed with density g(α, x).
There are two parties, party A and party B. Parties have fixed platforms in the policy space X.
Denote by xA = (x1A, x
2
A, ..., x
K
A ) party A’s platform and similarly for B. Those are the platforms
that parties will implement if elected. We take those platforms as fixed; for example, they are
contained in a written manifesto on which members of the party have reached a consensus. At this
electoral campaign stage, candidates are trying to get as many votes as possible, even though they
may not be purely office-motivated. Each party knows its platform, as well as that of its opponent.
But voters do not know any of those platforms with certainty. Before the electoral campaign starts,
voters share the same a priori beliefs on these platforms. Voters’ a priori on parties’ position
on the various issues are independent across parties and across issues. Voter’s a priori on xkJ
follows a normal distribution N
³
mkJ ,
¡
skJ
¢2´
. Those beliefs may come from past campaigns or
from observing the policies chosen by the party in charge during the previous legislatures, or from
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what they have heard during the party congress. Acquiring a perfect information about parties’
platforms would be prohibitively costly. Yet, voters have some opportunity to learn about these
platforms during the electoral campaign, and to update their beliefs as to where parties stand.
The campaign will be analyzed according to the following timing (see Figure 1).
(1) Candidates choose their emphasis strategy (or communication strategy).
(2) Voters are receptive to the campaign. There may however be some variation in the speeches
they listen to, the meetings they attend to, and how they interpret them. This may result in their
receiving different "signals" on parties’ platforms (yA, yB). Furthermore, voters may be affected
by idiosyncratic bias σ as defined below.
(3) Voters vote and the party getting the highest number of votes is elected. The winning
party implements its platform.
We now describe in more details each of these stages.
***** INSERT FIGURE1 ABOUT HERE *****
The electoral campaign stage Strategy sets. Each party decides how much time it wants to
devote to each issue. It is represented by a non negative vector t = (t1, t2, ..., tK). We consider
two types of time constraint that will be interpreted in due course.
In Section 4, up to a normalization, the maximal amount of time for each issue is one unit
(this normalization can be made issue by issue and for each party, as can be checked later on),
and the strategy space for a party writes as T = [0, 1]K .
In Section 5, parties are limited by a global time constraint. Up to a normalization the strategy
space for a party writes as: T =
n
t ∈ [0, 1]K s.t.
P
k t
k ≤ 1
o
.
Signals. Signals on a party’s position on a particular issue are noisy, unbiased, with a precision
that depends on the time spent by the party on that issue. Signals are normally distributed,
independent across parties and across issues. Specifically, when party J spends time tkJ speaking
on issue k, each voter receives an imperfect signal on party J ’s true position on this issue, ykJ with
distributionN
³
xkJ ,
¡
σkJ
¢2 ¡tkJ¢´ where function σkJ is defined over [0, 1], and satisfies : σkJ(0) = +∞
(pure noise if there is no speech) and
¡
σkJ
¢0
(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1[ (additional speech always makes
signals more precise). We make no specific assumption regarding the correlations of signals across
voters. They can be independently distributed (conditional on xA, xB) or correlated.
Remark. One may consider that xJ is a consensus reached within party J . Signals are noisy
because they are conveyed by different party’s members. Depending on the electoral system (and
the union within the party), the noise in the signals will be more or less important. An alternative
interpretation is that xJ is the candidate’s platform instead of the party’s platform. This may be
a more sensible interpretation in some elections where the candidate is quite independent from
the party, such as the US presidential election.1
1Having in mind those two interpretations, we indifferently use the term "party" or "candidate" to refer to this
player.
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Voters’ treatment of information. What are the voter’s posterior beliefs regarding the par-
ties’ platforms after the reception of these signals? Using the signals received during the campaign,
voters update their beliefs regarding the parties’ platforms. Each voter receives signals from the
candidates, yA = (y1A, y
2
A, ..., y
K
A ) from candidate A and yB = (y
1
B, y
2
B , ..., y
K
B ) from candidate B,
and she also perceives the time spent by both candidates (tA, tB) ∈ T × T on the various issues.
Consider a party, say A. Consider a voter who perceived a vector of signals yA on party A’s
platform, with an emphasis vector tA ∈ T . The conditional distribution on party A’s position on
issue k follows N
µcxkA ¡ykA, tkA¢ ³cskA´2 (tkA)¶, where:
1³cskA´2 (tkA) =
1¡
skA
¢2 + 1¡σkA¢2 ¡tkA¢ , (1)
cxkA ¡ykA, tkA¢ =
"cskA(tkA)
skA
#2
mkA +
" cskA(tkA)
σkA
¡
tkA
¢#2 ykA. (2)
Such a voter with bliss point x and weights α gets the expected utility if A is elected:
cuA(yA, tA;α, x) = −X
k
αk
∙³cxkA ¡ykA, tkA¢− x´2 + ³cskA´2 (tkA)¸ . (3)
The level cuB(yB, tB;α, x) is similarly defined for party B.
Note that voters are assumed to be naive (although they are Bayesian) in the sense that they
take at face values the messages sent by parties. They do not interpret the messages as stemming
from parties’ strategies. For example, when party A does not speak on issue k
¡
tkA = 0
¢
, the
voter’s a posteriori beliefs regarding party A0s position on this issue coincide with her a priori
beliefs. She does not interpret the fact that if a candidate does not talk about an issue, it might
be because he has no incentive to do so. Subsection 6.2 considers the case of more sophisticated
voters.
The vote stage. We model voters’ behavior using a "probabilistic voting" model. Candidates
do not only differ with respect to the policy platforms they put forward, they also differ in some
other dimension, unrelated to the policy issues at stake, which parties do not influence through
the campaign stage. It may involve some other attributes of the candidates, such as personal
characteristics (gender, race, age, ...), on which voters also have preferences. Assume that a voter
with parameters (α, x) votes for party A upon receiving signals yA, yB and given parties’ emphasis
tA, tB iff cuA(yA, tA;α, x) − cuB(yB, tB;α, x) > σ, where σ is an indiviual-specific bias in favor of
candidate B. Individual biases are taken to be i.i.d, with a uniform distribution on
h
− 12φ ,
1
2φ
i
.
Parties know the distribution of these biases but they do not know their realized values for each
individual at the time they have to choose their emphasis strategies.2
2This "probabilistic voting" model, considering individuals’ shocks on preferences which are independent of
preferences on platforms, has been introduced and first used by Coughlin (1983) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1993)
inter alia. The noise ensures the existence of an equilibrium in the standard model where purely office motivated
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The probability that such a voter votes for A is:
1
2
+ φ [cuA(yA, tA;α, x)− cuB(yB , tB ;α, x)] .3 (4)
Now, the expected vote share for a party only depends on the expectation of the probability
of votes over the electorate, given the time spent tA and tB. This is computed in two steps. First
by taking the expectation of the probability (4) that a given voter votes for A conditional on tA
and tB before the reception of the signals, and second by taking the average over the electorate.
Let E[cuJ(y˜J , tJ ;α, x)|tJ , xJ ] denote the expected value for a voter with characteristics α and
x that J is elected conditional on tJ before the reception of the signals (the˜over a variable, here
yJ , denotes that the value is random). This yields the expected vote share for party A as:
πA(tA, tB;xA, xB) =
1
2
+ φ
£
UA(tA;xA)− UB(tB;xB)
¤
, (5)
where
UJ(tJ ;xJ) =
Z
α
Z
x
E[cuJ(y˜J , tJ ;α, x)|tJ , xJ ]g(α, x)dαdx (6)
is the average expected utility for party J in the electorate when party J chooses emphasis strategy
tJ , given its true position xJ .4 The expected vote share for party B is the complement to 1:
πB(tA, tB ;xA, xB) = 1− πA(tA, tB;xA, xB). (7)
An alternative interpretation of the model. There is one single issue, and each k represents
a distinct electorate body -the electorate in a geographical area or an ethnic or social group for
instance. Under this interpretation, tk represents the time spent speaking to group k, through the
local media or the ’ethnic’ TV. A discussion of the results under this interpretation is provided in
subsection 5.4.
3 Impact of the campaign on votes
Before going to the equilibrium analysis, we first examine in some detail how the uncertainty in
the emphasis strategy impacts the party’s expected shares. In particular, we isolate the three
parties choose their platforms. Here, choosing some specific assumptions about the noise (additive and uniformly
distributed) allows for a simple analysis. Indeed, it yields a very simple form for the parties’ objectives (see Persson
and Tabellini (2000) who popularized these assumptions).
3More precisely, the expression holds true when fuA(yA, tA;α, x)− fuB(yB , tB ;α, x) ∈
k
− 1
2φ ,
1
2φ
l
. We take φ to
be large enough, so that we can neglect the cases where it does not hold.
4 In our probabilistic model, what matters for a candidate is the estimation of the number of votes. Hence ex-
pression (5) is identical whether signals are identical or conditionally independent across voters (or more generally
correlated). This is not true in general, as can be seen in a deterministic model. Without individual bias. an indi-
vidual with characteristics (α, x) votes for A upon receiving signals yA, yB if fuA(yA, tA;α, x)−fuB(yB , tB ;α, x) > 0.
If signals are independent (and independent of characteristics) the number of votes is independent of the sample of
the signals received by voters assuming a law of large numbers. Hence the impact of the speech is deterministic.
If instead signals are identical, the number of votes depends on the common signal received hence the impact of a
speech is random.
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channels we have hinted to in the introduction, and we derive an explicit form for the parties vote
shares.
Note first that given the expected vote share for party A (in (5)) and for party B (in (7)), each
party controls the utility expected by the electorate if it becomes elected. That is, J controls UJ ,
and the game is degenerate, in the sense that party J ’s best response does not depend upon its
opponent’s choice.
Consider A for example. Given its position xA, it solves the program:
MaxtA∈TUA(tA;xA).
We analyze how the campaign conducted by party A affects the average expected utility in the
electorate if A is elected UA. Observe that UA is separable across issues. To save on notation,
we first present the analysis in the single-issue case (K = 1), before proceeding to the multi-
dimensional case.
The single issue case. Our objective here is to analyze the various effects of strategy tA. For
that purpose, we derive some explicit formulation for UA as given by (6). We proceed in three
steps, first by computing the conditional utility cuA for a voter given the signals received (hence
when she votes), second by taking the point of view of party A which does not know the received
signals, and third by taking the average over the population
Impact of the campaign at the voter’s level. Consider first expression (3), which gives the
expected utility of a voter with characteristics (α, x) if candidate A is elected, upon the receipt
on signals yA : cuA(yA, tA;α, x) = −α h(cxA (yA, tA)− x)2 +csA2(tA)i . (8)
Note that without campaign, this voter achieves the expected utility −α[(mA − x)2 + s2A] if A is
elected. The precision of information on A’s position has two effects on the expected utility of A
being elected. A first effect is a change in the perception on A’s position from the prior mA to the
posterior5 cxA(yA, tA), which is a combination of the signal yA and the prior mA, as can be seen
from (2). A second effect is to reduce the voter’s uncertainty on the party’s platform, from sA2
to csA2(tA), which is unambiguously favorable to A.
Impact on a voter conditional on tA. Since candidate A does not know the signal that will be
received by the voter, it views the impact of speech on the voter’s posterior belief, cxA(yA, tA), as
random. The expectation of this posterior belief is E(cxA|tA, xA) = E(cxA(y˜A, tA)|tA, xA). (Since
signals are unbiased this expectation is the posterior obtained for a signal equal to the true position,cxA (xA, tA), by linearity of the posterior with respect to the signal.) By contrast, the variance of
the posterior cxA(y˜A, tA) given tA is independent of the position xA. We denote it by var(cxA|tA)
and call it the strategic risk. This risk is null when no information is conveyed (tA = 0), in which
5 In the sequel, we shall call mJ the prior belief on J ’s position, or simply prior, and fxJ the posterior belief
or simply posterior (although beliefs commonly design the entire distribution, we do not think it can create any
confusion).
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case the party knows that the best guess of the voter on the party’s position is mA (and ), or
when full information is conveyed, in which case the party knows that the voter knows the true
position xA. Indeed,
var(cxA|tA) = "1− csA2(tA)s2A
#csA2(tA).
This yields the conditional utility of a voter with characteristics (α, x) for A:
E[cuA(y˜A, tA;α, x)|tA, xA] = −α h(E(cxA|tA, xA)− x)2 +csA2(tA) + var(cxA|tA)i .
Impact on the electorate. The party’s objective UA(tA;xA) is obtained by taking the average
of the above expression over the electorate. It is more convenient, and equivalent from a strategic
point of view, to state the objective in terms of the change due to the campaign.
Preliminary proposition Given the true position xA, the change in the average expected utility
for A due to time tA, which we denote by ∆UA(tA;xA) = UA(tA;xA)− UA(0;xA), is:
α
h
(mA−x)2 − (E(cxA|tA, xA)−x)2i+ α hs2A −csA2(tA)i− αvar(cxA|tA), (9)
where α the average weight in the electorate and x is the average weighted bliss point:
α =
Z
α
Z
x
αg(α, x)dαdx, x =
Z
α
Z
x
αx
α
g(α, x)dαdx.
The effect of speech can be decomposed into an effect on voters (the two first terms in (9)) and
the strategic risk (the third term). Specifically the sum of the first two terms is the change in the
expected utility for a "representative voter" if A gets elected due to the campaign. The bliss point
of this representative voter is the average position x, his perception is the average perception over
the electorate, and the variance is the same as that of each voter.
Let us examine in more detail each term. The first term in (9) results from the change in
the voters’ expected assessments regarding party A’s true position. Let us label it the expected
posterior effect. This term is maximal when tA is such that E(cxA|tA, xA) is made as close as
possible to the average weighted bliss point in the electorate. The second term in (9) results from
the decrease voters ’uncertainty regarding party A’s position, and is unambiguously favorable
(because csA2(tA) is decreasing in tA from (1)). The third term results from the strategic risk
borne by parties, which may be non monotone, as we have seen.
It will prove useful in the sequel to work with a measure of the reduction in the uncertainty on
a party’s position due to the campaign and to introduce normalized variables. Given time spent
on the issue by party A, tA ∈ [0, 1], let us define:
hA(tA) = 1−
µcsA(tA)
sA
¶2
. (10)
Note that for all tA, hA(tA) ∈ [0, 1] , hA(0) = 0, and hA(tA) is strictly increasing in tA. As for
normalization, let us consider the deviation from the true position to the prior in terms of the
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standard error on A position eA(xA) and the deviation from the the average bliss point to the
prior in terms of the standard error on A position dA:
eA(xA) =
xA −mA
sA
, dA =
x−mA
sA
. (11)
With this notation, the expected posterior effect writes as αs2A
£
2dAeA(xA)hA(tA)− e2A(xA)h2A(tA)
¤
,
the reduced voters’ uncertainty effect as αs2AhA(tA), and the strategic risk as −αs2AhA(tA)(1 −
hA(tA)). Note that there are respectively, constant and increasing marginal benefit of precision.
Adding the last two effects, one finds αs2Ah
2
A(tA), which is unambiguously increasing in the preci-
sion, with increasing marginal benefit. The sum of the last two terms sums up the total effect on
uncertainly (borne both by voters and by the party through the strategic risk). We label it the
reduced variance effect. Adding the expected posterior effect and this reduced variance effect, the
marginal benefit of precision may be increasing or decreasing, depending on which effect matters
more. Indeed, the variation ∆UA writes as:
∆UA(tA;xA) = αs2A
£¡
1− e2A(xA)
¢
h2A(tA) + 2dAeA(xA)hA(tA)
¤
, (12)
which is a second degree polynom in hA.
The marginal benefit of precision at precision hA(tA) is:
2αs2A
£¡
1− e2A(xA)
¢
hA(tA) + dAeA(xA)
¤
. (13)
There are increasing marginal benefits from precision when the party’s position is less than a
standard error from the prior, e2A(xA) < 1, in which case the issue is said to be standard. In the
opposite case of a non standard issue, there are decreasing marginal benefits from precision.
The marginal benefit of precision at zero is positive for dAeA(xA) > 0, or equivalently for xA and
x located on the same side of mA, in which case the party’s position xA on the issue is said to be
favorable (and non favorable in the opposite case).
Multiple issues case Let hkA denote for each issue k the precision of party A on issue k:
hkA(t
k
A) = 1−
ÃcskA(tkA)
skA
!2
, tkA ∈ [0, 1] .
The change in the average expected utility for A being elected induced by the campaign depends
on the time party A spends discussing each issue tA = (tkA) ∈ T and on its position on each one
xA = (xkA). It is given by:
∆UA(tA;xA) =
X
k
αk
¡
skA
¢2 h³
1−
¡
ekA(x
k
A)
¢2´ ¡
hkA(t
k
A)
¢2
+ 2dkAe
k
A(x
k
A)h
k
A(t
k
A)
i
,
where
αk =
Z
α
Z
x
αkg(α, x)dαdx, xk =
Z
α
Z
x
αkxk
αk
g(α, x)dαdx, ekA(x
k
A) =
xkA −mkA
skA
, dkA =
xk −mkA
skA
.
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4 The case of a time constraint per issue
4.1 Optimal strategies
We have already observed that UA is separable across issues. This immediately implies that in
the absence of a global time constraint, that is, when the strategy space for a party writes as
T = [0, 1]K , the game can be analyzed issue by issue. This assumption about the strategy space
is certainly the right assumption to make if we interpret the strategies of the parties in terms of
choice of ambiguity. In that case, we may assume that a party decides the precision it wishes
to reach on each issue, with no global constraint. To save on notation in that case, we drop the
subscript k pertaining to the issue under study in this subsection. We will come back to the full
notation later in the text.
Party A chooses the time it spends explaining the issue, tA ∈ [0, 1], knowing its position xA.
Proposition 1 describes the optimal amount of time to be spent on the issue, as a function of
xA. Equivalently, party A actually chooses the precision hA reached on the issue. Denote by hA,
hA ∈ ]0, 1], the maximal reachable precision that candidate A can reach when he talks full time
(hA = hA(1)). When hA is smaller than 1, full precision (hA = 1) is not reachable. Party A can
choose any precision hA in the interval
£
0, hA
¤
. Results are presented in the case where the prior
on A 0s position (mA) is on the left of the electorate bliss point, and straightforwardly adapt to
the opposite case.
Proposition 1 Let mA ≤ x, or equivalently dA ≥ 0. The optimal strategy is characterized by two
thresholds eA < eA, such that:
(i) for eA(xA) < eA, party A does not talk,
(ii) for eA < eA(xA) < eA, party A uses the maximal amount of time,
(iii) for eA(xA) > eA, two cases are to be considered. If dA = 0, party A does not talk. If
dA > 0, party A uses a positive but less than maximal amount of time, which is decreasing with
xA.
The thresholds are given by
eA =
dA
hA
−
s
1 +
µ
dA
hA
¶2
< 0, eA =
1
2
dA
hA
+
s
1 +
µ
1
2
dA
hA
¶2
.
The proof of Proposition 1 follows from straightforward computation provided in the appendix.
The optimal strategy is illustrated on Figure 2.
***** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE *****
Comments. The optimal strategy solves the trade-off (if any) between the expected posterior
effect and the reduced variance effect, as defined in the previous section. It can be summarized as
follows: a party speaks when its position is favorable (eA(xA) > 0) or when its position, although
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not favorable, is close enough to the prior to allow for a reduction in voters’ uncertainty without
too much negative impact on the expected posterior (for dA > 0). Let us discuss this result in
more detail, assuming that full precision is reachable (hA = 1) so as to keep the comments simpler.
Let us consider the case mA < x, i.e. dA > 0. The case dA < 0 is symmetric, and the case
dA = 0 will be discussed at the end of this sub-section.
When the party’s true position is not favorable, that is, where the position xA and the average
bliss point x are on opposite sides of the prior mA (e(xA) < 0), whenever the party talks, the
expected posterior is further away from the average bliss point than the prior is. Thus the expected
posterior effect is unambiguously negative. The optimal strategy for the party is to remain silent,
except if the reduced variance effect is dominant. Note that it requires the marginal incentives to
speak to be increasing (standard position), in which case if a party talks, it talks full time. Indeed,
the marginal benefit of precision on an issue which is non favorable and non standard is always
negative (see (13)). The condition of indifference between no speech and full time speech gives
the first threshold value eA. Note that if the party’s payoff is positive when it speaks full time for
some a priori deviation from the representative voter dA > 0, then its payoff is also positive when
it speaks full time for some a priori deviation 0 < d0A < dA, that is, when the party is a priori
better aligned with the representative voter’ interests. This fact explains why the threshold eA
increases with dA.6
When the party’s true position xA is favorable, here when e(xA) > 0, the optimal strategy
for the party is to speak. It speaks full time and reveals its true position when the position is
moderate enough, (that is when e (xA) is below a second threshold eA which is larger than 0).
This is clearly optimal when e(xA) ≤ dA, since in that case the expected posterior position effect
and the reduced variance effect both play in the same direction. It is also clearly optimal when
e(xA) ≤ 1, since in that case there are increasing marginal returns of precision, and the marginal
benefit of precision is always positive (see (13)). Now, one should concentrate on cases where
e(xA) > max[dA, 1]. In that case, if the party was only concerned with the expected posterior
position effect, it would adjust its time so that the expected posterior beliefs about its position
exactly matches the average ideal position in the electorate x: it would not speak full time (but
choose an amount of speech dA/e(xA) < 1). Now, the reduced variance effect induces it to speak
full time instead when the position effect is not too detrimental that is when e(xA) is smaller than
the second threshold eA. This second threshold is obtained by the condition that the marginal
benefit of precision at full precision is zero. Note that there is some "overshooting", in the sense
that during the campaign, the party moves from a prior value below the representative voter’s
position (mA ≤ x) to a posterior above the average bliss point (E(cxA) > x). When the party’s
true position is large enough (e(xA) above the threshold eA), the reduced variance effect induces
to speak more than necessary to match the representative voter’s position (there is still some
overshooting), but not to a point where full time speech is optimal. The optimal speech time is
6A similar argument explains why the threshold eA decreases with the maximal reachable precision hA.
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decreasing with e(xA) and tends to zero as the position gets infinitely extreme.
The situation where a party’s prior coincides with the average bliss point (dA = 0) is rather
special since talking about the issue can only deteriorate the expected posterior and the only
motive is to reduce voters’ uncertainty. The party speaks full time when its position is less than
one standard error from the prior and does not speak otherwise.
4.2 Ex ante properties of the electoral campaign
In the previous subsection, we have commented upon the parties’ optimal strategies, as a function
of their true position. We now consider the ex ante properties of the electoral campaign, that
is, before knowing the candidates’ true positions. In what follows, N denotes the cumulative
distribution of a centered standard normal variable.
Issues can always be defined in such a way that A is a priori on the left to the average bliss
point, that is dkA ≥ 0. To simplify the discussion, we shall always do that and assume that on all
issues, A is a priori perceived as lying on the left-hand side of the average voter (but it could be
the case that B is not always on the right-hand side)
Which issues are the most likely to be addressed by a party? If for issue k, dkA = 0,
by Proposition 1, the party speaks full time when its position is standard and does not speak
otherwise. Party A’s position is standard on issue k whenever
¡
ekA
¢2 ≤ 1. This happens with
probability 0.68. Therefore, the ex ante probability that a party addresses such an issue is 0.68.
If for issue k, dkA > 0, a party speaks as soon as e
k
A
¡
xkA
¢
≥ ekA, where ekA is the threshold defined
in Proposition 1. Hence, for dkA > 0, the probability that a party talks is equal to 1 − N
h
ekA
i
.
This probability decreases with
µ
dkA
hkA
¶
from 0.84 to 1/2.7 Thus, the chances for a party to talk
about an issue are lower the more extreme it is a priori (the larger
¯¯¯
xk −mkA
¯¯¯
), the smaller the
uncertainty on its position (the smaller skA)
8 . and the lower the maximal reachable precision.
How many issues are addressed by a party? The discussion above shows that the proba-
bility that a party addresses a given issue is at least 1/2 and at most 0.84. Therefore, with a large
number of issues, we expect the party to address at least one half of the issues, and even more if
the priors on its platforms are close to the average bliss points.
It is very important to note that the probability that the party addresses an issue is at least 1/2,
no matter what the maximal reachable precision is, or alternatively, no matter what the available
amounts of time on the various issues are (here, we have normalized the available amount of time
on each issue to 1). In particular, it remains true if the maximal amount of time per issue is 1/K,
7 Since for dkA = 0, the probability that a party talks is 0.68, there is a jump upward to 0.84 because a large set
of positions becomes favorable when the prior does not exactly coincide with the average bliss point.
8Large a priori uncertainty are more likely to be observed for challengers (whose positions are unknown) or for
new issues at stake.
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which will make comparison with the globally constrained case (where we assume that the total
available time to be allocated across issues is 1) more meaningful.
Are the parties likely to address the same issues or not? In our analysis, it is clearly
possible that both parties speak on the same issue, a situation referred to as "issue convergence"
or by "dialogue" by Simon (2002). They do so as soon as speaking is favorable to both - which
is perfectly possible since the condition which defines whether a position is favorable or not only
relates to the party’s prior and true positions - relative to the average bliss point). Note that it is
also possible that no party talks about an issue.
From the computation above, the probability that both parties engage in dialogue on a specific
issue is at least 1/4, and no more than 0.70. This probability is close to its maximum when both
parties are a priori extremely close to the average bliss point. It is close to its minimum when
both parties are ex ante very extreme. A natural illustration of such a situation is when the prior
values mA and mB are each on one side of, and each far apart from, the average bliss point.
Another possible case is that both parties are on the same side and far away from the average
bliss point: parties agree between themselves but disagree with the electorate. This was the case
for example for the European Union issue in the 2007 French presidential election. (See more on
issue convergence in subsection 6.4).
4.3 Conclusions for the case without global time constraint
1. A party speaks about an issue when its position on this issue is favorable or when its position,
although not favorable, is close enough to the prior to allow for a reduction in voters’ uncertainty
without too much impact on the posterior.
2. The ex ante probability that a party addresses an issue (before knowing its position on that
issue) is minimal and equal to 1/2 when it is a priori extreme, and it is maximal (close to 0.84)
when it is a priori close to the average bliss point.
3. Both parties may address the same issues. The chances that both parties address a given
issue are at least 1/4, and can go up to 0.70 for issues where both parties are a priori close to the
average bliss point.
5 The case of a global time constraint
We now turn to the situation in which parties face a global time constraint and have to allocate
their overall time across issues: T =
n
(t1, t2, ..., tK) ∈ [0, 1]K and
P
k t
k ≤ 1
o
, up to a normal-
ization. There is one unit of time that has to be allocated between the issues.
Party A maximizes:
∆UA(tA;xA) =
X
k
αk
¡
skA
¢2 h³
1−
¡
ekA
¢2
(xkA)
´ ¡
hkA
¢2
(tkA) + 2d
k
Ae
k
A(x
k
A)h
k
A(t
k
A)
i
s. t. tA ∈ T.
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The optimal solution is not only determined by the values of ekA(x
k
A) and d
k
A, as in the case
where there is no global time constraint, but also by the sensitivity of the precision indices with
respect to the strategies. The marginal benefit derived by a marginal increase in addressing issue
k writes as:
∂UA
∂tkA
(tA;xA) = 2αk
¡
skA
¢2 ¡
hkA
¢0
(tkA)
h³
1−
¡
ekA
¢2
(xkA)
´
hkA(t
k
A) + d
k
Ae
k
A(x
k
A)
i
. (14)
To go further, the analysis is simplified by assuming each precision index hkA to be linear with
respect to tkA. If h
k
A(t
k
A) = h
k
At
k
A, with 0 < h
k
A ≤ 1 :
∂UA
∂tkA
(tA;xA) = 2αk
¡
skA
¢2
hkA
h³
1−
¡
ekA
¢2
(xkA)
´
hkAt
k
A + d
k
Ae
k
A(x
k
A)
i
,
∂2UA
∂
¡
tkA
¢2 (tA;xA) = 2αk ³skAhkA´2 ³1− ¡ekA¢2 (xkA)´ .
Under this assumption, the marginal benefit from an additional speech on an issue is either
increasing or decreasing, depending on whether the issue is in standard position or not.
5.1 Optimal strategies
Proposition 2 1. A party speaks on an issue where its position is non standard only if it is
favorable.
2. Assume the linearity of the precision measures hkJ for party J, and for each issue. A party
speaks on one issue in standard position at most.
Comments. Point 1 simply states that speaking on an issue for which both terms dkAe
k
A and
1−
¡
ekA
¢2
are non positive is strictly dominated for A (neglecting the case where both terms are
null). Dominance holds because the marginal benefit from speaking on issue k is always negative
as can be seen from (14). This is also true in the case where there is no global time constraint.
As for point 2, we present the basic intuition (the formal proof is in the appendix). Let the
party speak about two issues in standard position, say k and c. Under the global time constraint
assumption, the marginal benefits are equalized between these issues and are both positive. The
objective is convex with respect to the time spent on one issue. Hence increasing the time spent
on one issue at the expense of the other is surely beneficial, which gives the contradiction.
A simple consequence of Proposition 2 can be drawn if all issues are in standard position.
Then, the party concentrates on a single issue. If there are both kinds of issues, the time spent
on those with decreasing marginal benefit is allocated by equalizing the marginal benefit on these
issues and the remaining time is concentrated on a single issue in standard position.
5.2 The ex ante properties of the electoral campaign
How many issues are addressed by a party? The probability for an issue to be in standard
position is equal to 0.68, and the probability for a position to be favorable is 0.50. Note that
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those probabilities are independent of the issue parameters. With a large number of issues, the
proposition gives an upper bound of 0.16 per cent on the number of issues that are addressed on
average: 0.68 % of the issues are not addressed (those in standard position but one) and half of
those in non standard position are not addressed (because their position is non favorable).
Which issues are the most likely to be addressed by a party? The proposition is silent
about which issues are ex ante addressed. We shall argue that when there are many potential
issues, the probability of addressing an issue is larger the more a priori extreme the party is on
that issue (prior far from the average bliss point).
Consider an issue k, and make a party, say A, a priori more extreme on this issue by increasing
dkA, for d
k
A > 0, other issues being unchanged. The question we want to address is whether issue
k has now more chances to be addressed by party A. It is important to note that the law of the
standardized deviation to the prior ekA =
xkA−mkA
skA
is independent of dkA. Consider a fixed vector of
deviations (e1A, e
2
A, ..., e
K
A ) for which the issue is addressed by A with the initial value of d
k
A > 0,
and let us show that under this same vector of deviations, party A will most certainly still address
the issue when dkA increases.
Note that the marginal benefit of the first unit of precision on this issue k writes as αk
¡
skA
¢2 dkAekA.
Thus, this marginal benefit for A increases with dkA when the position is initially favorable to A,
which occurs when ekA is positive, and decreases in the opposite situation. Besides, the fact that
the party’s position is standard or not on issue k only depends on the deviation ekA, and not on
the prior.
Now, if initially the position on issue k is favorable (ekA ≥ 0), from the remark just above, it is
surely still addressed by A as dkA increases. When the position on issue k is not favorable and not
standard (ekA ≤ −1), the issue is not addressed in the first place (point 1 of Proposition 2). Thus,
the only situation where an increase in dkA may deter A from addressing the issue occurs when
the issue is in standard position but unfavorable (−1 ≤ ekA ≤ 0), and party A initially addressed
the issue. However, this case occurs with small probability since at most one issue in standard
position is addressed by A (point 2 of Proposition 2).
Are the parties likely to address the same issues or not? From the computation above,
with a large number of issues, the probability that a party addresses one given issue is at most
16%. Therefore, the upper bound for the probability that both parties talk about the same issue
is below 3%.
Discussion. What can be said without assuming the linearity of the precision parameters hkJ
with respect to time? First, if for each issue, the objective is either concave or convex with respect
to time, the same properties as stated above hold. This is likely to occur if the convexity or
concavity in the precision parameters is moderate, which is likely under our assumption of tight
time constraint. Otherwise, the concavity of the precision parameter may be the more plausible
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assumption. In that case, the objective is more concave with respect to the allocation of time
than with respect to precision. In particular it is concave for each non standard issue.
5.3 Conclusions for the case with a global time constraint
Assume the linearity of the precision measures hkJ for each party, and for each issue.
1. A party speaks on one issue in standard position at most.
2. With a large number of issues, at most 16% of the issues are addressed by a party.
3. The chances that a party addresses an issue increase when the party becomes a priori more
extreme on that issue.
4. With a large number of issues, at most 3% of the issues are addressed by both parties:
parties do not address the same issues.
5.4 An alternative interpretation of the model
An alternative interpretation is the following one. Time can be interpreted as a scarce resource,
some given amount of money to be spent on advertising for instance, and issues can be interpreted
as a distinct electorate body - the electorate in a geographical area or an ethnic or social group
for instance. Under this interpretation, tkA represents the time spent by candidate A speaking to
the group k, through the local media or the ’ethnic’ TV. The analysis carries through under the
proviso that individuals in one group do not listen to the speeches addressed to the other groups.
In that case, the model describes the optimal strategy by candidates when deciding how to target
the money they have across districts when designing a campaign.
Under this interpretation, there are some restrictions on the parameters. First the position in
each area is the candidate’ position, which requires xkA = xA for each k. Keeping our assumption
that individuals share the same prior at the beginning of the campaign, one has mkA = mA and
skA = sA for each k. Therefore, all groups share the same e
k
A(xA). To simplify the notation, let
us simply denote it by eA. There is a priori no further restriction on the average bliss points in
those electorates xk (embodied in the dkA),on their size α
k, nor on their capacities to interpret
information (the σkA(.), σ
k
B(.) functions). If we assume that precision in each group is linear in
time, with hkA
¡
tk
¢
= tk, we can use the results previously obtained to derive the optimal campaign
strategy.
If a candidate’s position is standard (e2A < 1), he speaks to at most one group. If for all groups,
(1− e2A) + 2eAdkA < 0, he does not talk at all; if not, he speaks full time to the group k∗, where:
k∗ = argmax
k
h
αk
¡
(1− e2A) + 2eAdkA
¢i
.
A group is more likely to be addressed when it represents a large fraction of the electorate (large
αk) or when it is a priori extreme but with an average bliss point on the same side of the prior
as the true position (large eAdkA).
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If a candidate’s position is non standard (e2A > 1), he speaks to a group only if his position in
this group is favorable. Provided that this is the case for at least one group, among the groups
in which his position is favorable, he speaks to the group with the highest αkdkA and possibly to
some other favorable groups, organizing speeches in order to equalize marginal benefits of time
2αk
¡
(1− e2A)tk + eAdkA
¢
across those groups. In that case again, large, favorable, extreme groups
are better targets.
6 Discussion
6.1 Impact of the campaign on welfare
We briefly discuss some consequences of the electoral campaign on voters’ welfare. We do not
provide a full welfare analysis here, but simply underline some a priori counter-intuitive properties
of an electoral campaign. A simple example in the single issue case shows that although parties
convey unbiased information, electoral campaign may prove to be detrimental to voters, in the
sense that voters’ welfare would be higher with no information at all, than with the information
conveyed at equilibrium during the campaign.
This result challenges the classical measure of the informational quality of the campaign by
the total amount of speeches delivered by parties, or the amount of effective information that is
transmitted to voters.
Definition of voters’ welfare. We use an ex ante utilitarist criterion to assess welfare.
Let pJ(tA, tB, xA, xB) denote the probability that party J wins the election, given true plat-
forms (xA, xB), when party A (resp. B) spends the amount of time tA (resp. tB) explaining its
platform. The average expected utility in the electorate given those (tA, tB, xA, xB) is:
fW (tA, tB, xA, xB) = pA(tA, tB , xA, xB)u(xA) + pB(tA, tB , xA, xB)u(xB),
where
u(z) =
Z
α
Z
x
u(z;α, x)g(α, x)dαdx (15)
is the average utility in the electorate when the platform z is implemented.
We further assume that the probability that J wins the election is an affine function of party
J ’s expected vote share πJ : pJ = 12 +β
¡
πJ − 12
¢
, 0 < β < 1, where party J ’s expected vote share
is given by (5) and (7).9 Therefore, the change in voters’ welfare induced by emphasis (tA, tB)
given true platforms (xA, xB) is:
∆fW (tA, tB, xA, xB) = βφ ¡∆UA (tA, xA)−∆UB (tB, xB)¢ (u(xA)− u(xB)) .
This expression shows that the campaign is welfare enhancing iff the campaign increases the
probability that the party which is the closest to the average bliss point wins the election. Indeed,
9For example, following Persson and Tabellini (2000), we assume that an additive uniformly distributed macro
random shock occurs after parties have decided their emphasis strategies.
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in the expression above, βφ
¡
∆UA (tA, xA)−∆UB (tB , xB)
¢
is the change in the probability that
party A wins the election which is induced by emphasis (tA, tB) given the true platforms (xA, xB).
If one denotes by TJ : R → [0, 1] a strategy for party J , that is the amount of time spent on
the issue depending on the true position, the ex ante welfare variation induced by the campaign
depends on these strategies TA, TB , and writes as:
∆W (TA, TB) = ExA,xB∆fW (TA(xA), TB(xB), xA, xB). (16)
The positive value of unconditional information. Consider first as a benchmark the case
where the communication strategies are independent of the true positions xA, xB, that is, the
communication by the parties tA, tB are fixed ex ante. In that case, TJ(xJ) = tJ = cst. Simple
computation yields the following formula for the welfare variation:
2βφα2
X
J=A,B
s4J
£
2d2JhJ(tJ) + h
2
J(tJ)
¤
.10 (16)
In that case, the welfare is increasing and convex in hA and hB. When the precision conveyed is
independent from the positions xA, xB, more precision is always valuable.
An example of welfare reducing campaign. Now, to assess welfare in the electoral campaign
game, one needs to replace in the expression (16) above the emphasis vector (TA(xA), TB(xB)) by
the optimal strategies computed in section 4.
We show in a very simple example that an electoral campaign may be detrimental to voters’
welfare. Consider the special case where both parties’ a priori positions coincide with the average
bliss point in the electorate (dJ = 0). In that case (proposition 1), party J talks full time when
e2J(xJ) ≤ 1, and remains silent in all other cases. Hence the optimal strategy is TJ(xJ) = 1 if
e2J(xJ) ≤ 1 and TJ(xJ) = 0 otherwise. Simple computation yield the following formula for the
variation of welfare induced by the campaign (assuming that full precision is reachable by both
parties):
βφα2
£
2s2As
2
B (C0 − C2)−
¡
s4A + s
4
B
¢
(C2 − C4)
¤
, where Cn =
Z
e2<1
enf(e)de.11 (16)
10
Indeed, ∆UJ (tJ , xJ ) = αs2J

−h2J (tJ ) e2J (xJ ) + 2dJhJ (tJ ) eJ (xJ ) + h2J (tJ )

, and
u(xA)− u(xB) = −α
k
s2A (eA(xA)− dA)2 − s2B (eB(xB)− dB)2
l
.
Since ExJ∆UJ (tJ , xJ ) = 0, ∆W = ΣJExJ

∆UJ (tJ , xJ )u(xJ )

, with
ExJ

∆UJ (tJ , xJ )u(xJ )

= 2α2s4J

2d2JhJ (tJ ) + h
2
J (tJ )

.
11
Indeed, ExAxB

∆UA (TA(xA), xA)−∆UB (TB(xB), xB)

(u(xA)− u(xB))

=
Ee2A(xA)≤1

∆UA (1, xA) (u(xA)−ExB [u(xB)])

−Ee2B(xB)≤1

∆UB (1, xB) (ExA [u(xA)]− u(xB))

,
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Comments. (1) Note first that an electoral campaign may be detrimental to the voters’ welfare.
For example, if sA is small enough (given a value for sB), voters would be better off with no
campaign. It might sound counter-intuitive, since during the campaign, only unbiased information
is conveyed to the electorate. The reason is that the candidate who has the more incentives to
talk - and benefits the more from the campaign - might not be the one who is the better for the
electorate (that is, that whose position is closer to the average voter). This situation is likely to
happen when an incumbent candidate faces an unknown challenger.
(2) When s2A = s
2
B = s
2, the variation in welfare is:
2βφα2s4 (C0 − 2C2 + C4) , with C0 − 2C2 + C4 =
Z
e2<1
(1− e2)f(y)dy > 0,
and in that case the electoral campaign is welfare enhancing. The gain in welfare due to the
campaign is increasing with voters’ a priori uncertainty on parties’ positions.
(3) This simple example shows that it might be quite misleading to use as a proxi for the quality
of the campaign the amount of time that parties have spent discussing an issue. In this example,
whatever the value of sA, sB, the probability that a party addresses the issue is C0 = 0.68. In
some cases (low uncertainty on one party, high uncertainty on the other), the campaign is welfare
reducing, whereas in some other cases (for example symmetric parties), the campaign is welfare
improving.
6.2 Information transmission about the opponent’s platform
So far, we have assumed that parties only send voters information about their own platform. We
are going to discuss this assumption here. Indeed, it could well be the case that when a party
addresses an issue, it actually sends information to voters both as to where it stands, and as to
where its opponent stands, on the issue. It might be because when a candidate chooses to address
an issue in a radio or TV show, the journalist might prompt him to clarify his position relative
to that of his opponent. It might also be the case that when he chooses to put more weight on an
issue, newspapers and radios tend to dig into what the opponent wants to do on the same issue,
thus conveying some information on the opponent as well. In those examples, we are talking about
"involuntary" transmission of information. Another possibility is that the amount of information
conveyed about the opponent is a variable that is fully under the control of the party, and can
be independent from the amount of time spent discussing its own position on the issue. In this
view, each party would have to allocate its time between describing its own position on the various
issues, and those of its opponent.
In this section, we explore the consequences of the former kind of information transmission.
with Ee2A(xA)≤1

∆UA (1, xA) (u(xA)−ExB [u(xB)])

= α2s2AEe2A(xA)≤1

e2A − 1
 
s2Ae
2
A − s2B

= α2

s2As
2
B (C0 − C2)− s4A (C2 −C4)

,
and −Ee2B(xB)≤1

∆UB (1, xB) (ExA [u(xA)]− u(xB))

= α2

s2As
2
B (C0 − C2)− s4B (C2 −C4)

.
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We propose a simple model of involuntary leakage of information. This model will be parametrized
by a parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1/2], capturing the amount of information leakage. One polar case, ρ = 0,
corresponds to the situation in which each party only conveys information on its own platforms.
This is the model we have studied in the previous sections. The other polar case, ρ = 1/2,
corresponds to the situation where a party is constrained to send the same amount of information
on its platform and that of his opponent. We are going to present here some results on this other
polar case.
Involuntary information leakage. During the campaign, each party decides how much time
to spend discussing each issue, subject to some time constraint. We assume that when party A
(resp. party B) spends time tkA (resp. t
k
B) on issue k, each voter receives two imperfect signals
regarding issue k: one on party A’s true position, ykA, whose variance depends on some weighted
average of the times spent by both parties discussing the issue, (1− ρ) tkA+ρtkB, and one signal on
party B’s true position ykB , whose variance depends on ρt
k
A + (1− ρ) tkB . The parameter ρ, which
is assumed to lie in the interval ρ ∈ [0, 1/2], describes the information leakage technology. We
assume here that a party is always more informative about its own position than about that of its
opponent. Signals on parties’ positions are assumed to be unbiased, independently (across issues)
and normally distributed:
ykA ∼ N
³
xkA,
¡
σkA
¢2 ¡
(1− ρ) tkA + ρtkB
¢´
, ykB ∼ N
³
xkB,
¡
σkB
¢2 ¡
ρtkA + (1− ρ) tkB
¢´
,
with σkJ(0) = +∞,
¡
σkJ
¢0
(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1[. We make no specific assumption regarding the
correlations of signals across voters. They can be independently distributed (conditional on xA,
xB) or correlated.
Parties expected vote share. Making the same assumptions about voters’ treatment of in-
formation, and following the same probabilistic voting model as before, one easily checks that the
expected vote share for party A is now simply:
πA(tA, tB;xA, xB) =
1
2
+ φ
£
UA((1− ρ) tA + ρtB ;xA)− UB(ρtA + (1− ρ) tB;xB)
¤
.
Remark. The case ρ = 0 corresponds to situations where a party fully controls the utility
expected by the electorate if it becomes elected, and has no influence on the utility expected
by the electorate if its opponent is elected. When ρ is positive, it is no longer the case, and
the game between parties is non degenerate. In particular, the case ρ = 1/2 corresponds to
situations where all that matters in the total quantity of time that is devoted to an issue by both
parties, independently on the identity of the party addressing the issue. The remaining part of
the subsection is devoted to presenting some result in that case ρ = 1/2.
Issue by issue time constraint. Assume first that parties face an issue by issue time constraint:
T = [0, 1]K . As noted above, when ρ = 1/2, the impact of speech does not depend on which party
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is speaking (formally, ∂πA∂tkA
(tA, tB;xA, xB) = ∂πA∂tkB
(tA, tB ;xA, xB)). Hence if a party strictly benefits
from an additional quantity of speech on any given issue, its opponent is made strictly worse off
by it. Besides, with no global time constraint, it is in the interest of at least one party to address
each issue. These properties have strong implications.
Proposition 3 At an equilibrium in pure strategies (assuming it exists), for each issue, one party
talks full time and the other remains silent.
At such an equilibrium, all issues are addressed, but no issue is simultaneously addressed
by both candidates. Yet, an equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist. To overcome the
possible non existence of equilibria in pure strategies, we consider the game in which parties play
sequentially. The party that plays first, say A, is the "first mover". The "follower", B, observes
the strategy chosen by A before choosing its own emphasis: its strategy is a reaction function.12
Note that an equilibrium in pure strategies in the simultaneous version of the game remains an
equilibrium in the sequential version. An equilibrium always exists in this sequential version of
the game. To say more, assume the linearity of the precision indices hkA and h
k
B : h
k
J(t) = h
k
J t,
with 0 < hkJ 6 1 for J = A,B. In that case, it can be proven that it is still the case that each
issue is addressed by at least one party at equilibrium.
This contrasts with the result obtained with no leakage, where it could be the case that both
parties remained silent on some issues, and where both parties could address the same issues at
equilibrium.
Global time constraint. Assume now that parties face a global time constraint:
T =
(
(t1, t2, ..., tK) ∈ [0, 1]K and
X
k
tk ≤ 1
)
.
Note that it remains true that at an equilibrium in pure strategies of the simultaneous version
of game (if it exists), no issue is addressed by both candidates. When considering the sequential
version, some similar results obtain.
Proposition 4 Let precision indices hkJ(t) be linear with respect to t for each issue k, each party J.
At an equilibrium in the sequential version of game, at most one issue is simultaneously addressed
by both candidates.
The proof is given in the appendix. These results are to be contrasted to those obtained in
the no leakage case. With no leakage and a global time constraint, the ex ante probability that
both parties address an issue is also small. Indeed, the upper bound for the probability that
both parties talk about the same issue is below 3%. But the rationale behind the results are quite
different. With no leakage, the propensity for one party to address an issue is independent of
12There is no bad connotation in the term ’follower’. In political life, the incumbent is likely to be the follower.
In fact, recall that, in two players zero-sum game, it is never a (strict) advantage to move first.
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that of its opponent. Simply, each party addresses a small number of issues, and consequently,
the probability that both parties address the same issues is even smaller. With full leakage, the
situation is quite different. Now, the propensity for one party to address an issue depends on the
relative strength of the parties on that issue. And if one party benefits from addressing it, its
opponent loses from it.
6.3 Truthful parties and naive voters
Our analysis relies on two important assumptions.
The first assumption bears on voters, who may be considered as "naive" (although they are
Bayesian). Indeed, consider for example party A’s optimal strategy in the single issue case, as a
function of the position xA, as described in Proposition 1. A "sophisticated" or strategic voter
who knows this function is able to infer more than what we have assumed so far. In particular,
such a voter can infer that a candidate who does not address an issue has a position such that
e(xA) is below the threshold eA. Similarly, by observing a positive precision below the maximal
precision hA, she can infer the true position since this occurs only for positions such that e(xA)
is above eA and A’s precision is one-to-one for these positions. This changes the voter’s behavior.
Knowing this, a candidate also changes his strategy. The impact depends on the assumed number
of strategic voters. In the discussion that follows, we shall assumed all voters to be strategic.
The second assumption bears on candidates, who are constrained to send unbiased signals on
their true platform. In a sense, they are ’sincere’, or in other words, they are somewhat committed
to their announcements.
We investigate how equilibria are modified when these assumptions are relaxed. Combining
the assumptions naive versus sophisticated voters, and unbiased versus free signals, there are
three additional cases to consider. We conduct the analysis in the single issue model so that it
is equivalent to argue in terms of precision or time. With unbiased signals, a strategy specifies
a precision as a function of the true position (xA). In the absence of such constraint, a strategy
specifies a mean and a precision, μA and hA respectively, for A, as a function of the position. To
simplify, we shall assume that full precision (hA = 1) is reachable by the candidate.
Naive voters and no constraint on signals. With naive voters, an action (μA, hA) determines
the posterior assigned to A position as E (cxA) = (1− hA)mA + hAμA, and the average expected
utility UA for A being elected is given by:
u (E (cxA))− αs2A ¡1− h2A¢ , (17)
where the first term (u (E (cxA))) decreases as the distance between the expected posterior and the
average bliss point increases. By choosing the maximal precision (equal to 1) and an announcement
that is equal to the average bliss point in the electorate x,the utility in (17) is null, which is the
maximum possible value. Announcing the average bliss point without any ambiguity is an optimal
strategy. (Without full precision, the result extends straightforwardly). Of course both candidates
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will do the same. Hence, with naive voters and free signals, the standard convergence result applies
(in announcements): both candidates announce the position of the average voter. No information
is transmitted.
Sophisticated voters and no constraint on signals. We will show that in that case, all
actions taken by A at equilibrium can only induce the same payoff for A. Assume by contradiction
that, at equilibrium, A0s strategy is such that both actions (μA, hA) and (μ0A, h
0
A) are played with
positive probability, and that voters’ equilibrium beliefs are such that the probability that A wins
the election is greater for the former action than for the latter. Then when A draws a position
such that this strategy specifies that it should play the latter action, it would be strictly better
off choosing the former instead. Indeed, when there is no commitment, the action chosen by a
party does not convey any direct information to voters on its true position. Sophisticated voters
know this. Which contradicts the fact that at equilibrium actions yielding different payoffs can be
played with positive probability. Hence, all actions taken by A at an equilibrium strategy have to
induce the same payoff to A (note that the argument is valid for pure or mixed strategy as well).
No information is transmitted.
Sophisticated voters and unbiased signals. Consider the strategy where both parties always
send perfect information on their true position (hA = hB identical to 1). It is an equilibrium. To
show this, the voters’ ’out of equilibrium’ behavior must be specified. Assume that when voters
observe imprecise messages by one party, they vote for the opponent.13 With sophisticated voters
and commitment all information can be revealed at an equilibrium.
With non-strategic naive voters on the contrary, there are always extreme positions far enough
from the average bliss point for which A benefits from being imprecise. For example, by not
talking at all, the candidate secures itself the value u(mA)− αs2A with naive voters.
6.4 Literature on the content of electoral campaigns
We believe that our model helps shed some light on a number of empirical facts or controversies
that have recently emerged on the content of electoral campaigns, in particular around the "issue
ownership theory" by Petrocik (1996), and the striking differences that have been documented
between presidential and senate elections in the US.
According to Petrocik (1996) and the "issue ownership theory", some issues are widely per-
ceived by voters as better handled by one party (say the Republicans), and some other issues by
the other party. For example, the Republicans traditionally "own" the crime and national security
issues, whereas the Democrats "own" the welfare or environmental issues. According to Petrocik,
candidates should tend to campaign on issues on which they have an advantage to prime their
13This behavior can be supported by the fact that voters interpret this imprecise message as evidence that the
party is so far away from their own bliss point that they are better off voting for the opponent.
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salience when voters make their voting decisions: they should emphasize the issues they own and
downplay the issues they do not. This predicts that parties should concentrate on few issues, and
that there should not address the same issues.
Simon (2002) offers a theoretical model as to why it should be the case14 . As he puts it
(page 64), “As no theme can work to the advantage of both candidates, they will never allocate
resources to the same theme. Dialogue is defined as candidates discussing (spending money on)
the same dimensions, so, rational candidates should never and will never dialogue.” Then, focusing
on 49 US Senate races in 1988, 1990 and 1992 and using home-state newspaper coverage of the
candidates’ statements on 32 issues, he determines how much attention each issue received during
the campaigns. His results are partly consistent with the issue ownership theory, in that the
Democrats do very little speaking about immigration, and crime, while they instigate a great deal
of discussion about welfare, women’s issues, environment and education (Table 7.4 page 132).
There is less dialogue on the owned issues than on remaining unowned issues (Figure 7.1 page
133).
Yet, other empirical works, notably by Sigelman and Buell (2004), have provided strong ev-
idence against the theory of issue ownership as defined by Simon or Petrocik. They test for
"dialogue" in US presidential campaigns, focusing on the statements by campaigners for the two
major parties in the eleven presidential campaigns between 1960 and 2000. Those statements
were extracted from all the news items published in the New York Times that referred explic-
itly to the presidential campaigns. They find that both sides generally address the same issues
(see table 1 page 655) and conclude from their analysis that dialogue is the rule rather than the
exception. Even work by Petrocik et al. (2004) offers evidence that can be interpreted as quite
contradictory with the issue ownership theory. Their paper presents content analysis of the accep-
tance addresses and television spot advertisements of presidential candidates from 1952 through
2000. They show that Democrats spend roughly the same amount of time on Democratic and
Republican-owned issues, while Republicans spend over two-thirds of their time (67% in TV spots
and 69% in nomination addresses) on Republican-owned issues (Table 3 in the appendix page
626).
One reason that may explain those discrepancies might be found in the fact that Simon’s study
uses senate elections data, whereas the last two afore mentioned papers relate to presidential
elections. Indeed, Kaplan et al. (2006) provide evidence that the two kind of elections might
be quite different, in terms of campaign strategies. They look for issue convergence using data
that cover both Senate campaigns (1998, 2000, 2002) and the 2000 presidential election. They
divide issues in 50 different issues categories each year. They find much more issue convergence
in presidential campaigns than in Senate campaigns. As the authors put it (page 729), “The data
suggest, then, that Senate campaigns are qualitatively different than presidential campaigns. On
average, there is considerably less issue convergence in Senate races that in the presidential race.”
14 for further analysis of this model, see Amoros and Puy (2007).
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Our model may offer a unified framework that could account for those empirical findings. The
amount of money available to candidates in presidential and senate campaigns vary widely. One
could argue that the Senate races, being strongly financially constrained, are best modelled as
campaigns with binding global constraints, whereas the presidential races, that feature at least 10
to 20 times the spending of the average Senate race are much less so. The no global constraint
case could be a good approximation of the Presidential campaign, whereas the constrained case
would be more relevant to describe Senate elections. We indeed find that there is more issue
convergence, and more issues addressed in the former case than in the latter, which is consistent
with the empirical findings mentioned above.
On the theoretical part, our paper can be seen as an attempt to provide a somewhat richer
version of the issue ownership theory. In Simon (2002), voters know exactly where the parties
stand on each issue, and when talking about an issue, candidates only increase the salience of this
issue in the voters’ eyes. We abandon this assumption of perfect information and assume instead
that voters learn about parties’ positions through the campaign. In that case, we can define a
version of “ex ante issue ownership”, defining a party as the owner of an issue when it is a priori
close to the average bliss point on this issue whereas its opponent is a priori far away from it on
that issue. With this definition, we offer a more nuanced result: even a candidate who is a priori
far away from the average bliss point on an issue may want to address this issue. Indeed, if the
candidate is less extreme that his party is perceived to be on this issue, the candidate will have
some incentives to signal to the voter that his position is more congruent with the voters’ interests
than it was initially thought to be. In our model, all issues are addressed with positive probability.
Yet, our results retain some of the flavor of the issue-ownership theory: we indeed find that the
probability to address an issue for a party increases with the proximity of the prior to the average
voter. If one party is a priori very close to the average bliss point, the probability that it talks
about this issue is high and close to its maximum (0.84) whereas when it is perceived as a priori
quite extreme, the probability that it addresses this issue decreases. As Kaplan et al. (2006) put
it (page 735), “We suspect that issue ownership’s failure to account for much variation in issue
convergence is due to insufficient attention to the relationship between issue ownership at the
party level and issue ownership at the candidate level. Scholars have long noted that candidates
may find it in their interest to distance themselves from their party’s reputation.” We offer a
model that precisely addresses this point.
7 Conclusion
We proposed a simple model designed to capture the benefits and the costs that candidates may
face when transmitting to voters information about their platforms. The analysis reveals that the
equilibrium communication strategies are very different depending on the assumption we make
about the time constraint faced by the parties.
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With no global time constraint, parties tend to talk on issues on which they are a priori
congruent with the average voter, and they may address a large number of issues: the fraction
of issues that are addressed varies between 50% and 84%. In that case, both parties may address
the same issues, they will do so in at least 25% of the issues. On the contrary, when parties face
a global time constraint, dialogue will be the exception rather than the rule. At most 16% of the
issues are addressed by a party., and at most 3% are addressed by both.
Our results suggest that the communication strategies of parties will be very different depend-
ing on the media they use, and on the type of races they are involved in. In a political meeting
where they can use their time pretty much as they want, or in an add campaign where they can
freely choose the themes they want to advertise, they will tend to focus on a small number of
issues. On the contrary, when they cannot freely allocate the time between issues, for example in
an interview where a journalist chooses the agenda, they will send relevant information a much
larger of issues, and will be more likely to send information on issues on which they are a priori
congruent with the average voter. Our results also shed light on a number of empirical papers
comparing the qualitative properties of presidential and Senate elections campaigns. We provide
an explanation as to why more issues are addressed and more dialogue is observed in the former
than in the latter.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Party A can choose any precision hA in
£
0, hA
¤
, 0 < hA ≤ 1. UA
is convex in hA iff e2A ≤ 1, that is iff the candidate’s position is standard. Let mA < x, that is
dA > 0.
Consider first the case of a standard position. Since UA is convex, the optimal precision for A
is either 0 or hA. The precision hA = hA is optimal iff (1− e2A(xA))hA + 2eA(xA)dA ≥ 0, which
writes as eA(xA) ≥ eA and defines threshold eA.
Consider now the opposite case where the candidate’s position is non standard. UA is (strictly)
concave in hA. Without constraint on hA, it reaches its maximum at h∗A =
dAeA(xA)
e2A(xA)−1
. If h∗A ≤ 0, the
optimal precision for A is 0 ; since the denominator of h∗A is positive this occurs if eA(xA)dA < 0,
that is if xA is not favorable. For xA favorable. the optimal precision for A is hA if h∗A is larger than
hA, which writes as eA(xA) ≤ eA and defines eA. Otherwise, if xA is favorable and eA(xA) ≥ eA
the optimal precision is h∗A < hA, which is decreasing with eA(xA) and goes to zero as eA(xA)
gets infinitely large.
Proof of proposition 2. Let us write the first order conditions associated with the maximiza-
tion of UA under a global time constraint. There is λ nonnegative such that
∂UA
∂tkA
(tA;xA) ≤ λ with an equality if tkA > 0.
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Under linearity, hkA
¡
tkA
¢
= hkAt
k
A,
¡
hkA
¢0
is constant and equal to hkA. Point 1 is trivial because
speaking on an issue in non standard and non favorable position is dominated. Point 2 follows
from the second order condition. At a solution where both tkA and t
c
A are positive the second order
condition writes as: ³
hlA
´2 ³
1−
¡
elA
¢2´
+
³
hkA
´2 ³
1−
¡
ekA
¢2´ ≤ 0, (18)
which cannot be satisfied if both positions on issues k and c are standard, i.e. if both
¡
elA
¢2
and¡
ekA
¢2
are smaller than 1.
Proof of proposition 3. For any t ∈ [0, 1]K , denote by g(t) the vote share of party A when
the average time spent by the two party on issue k is tk and true positions are xA, xB :
g(t;xA, xB) =
1
2
+ φ
£
UA(t;xA)− UB(t;xB)
¤
.
With this notation,
∂πA
∂tkA
(tA, tB ;xA, xB) =
∂kπA
∂tkB
(tA, tB;xA, xB) =
1
2
∂g
∂tk
µ
tA + tB
2
;xA, xB
¶
.
Proposition 3. states that if (t∗A, t
∗
B) is an equilibrium in pure strategies, necessarily, for each
issue k, either
¡
t∗kA , t
∗k
B
¢
= (0, 1) or
¡
t∗kA , t
∗k
B
¢
= (1, 0).
Assume by contradiction that (t∗A, t
∗
B) is an equilibrium with t
∗k
A ∈ ]0, 1[. In that case, neces-
sarily, ∂g∂tk
³
t∗A+t
∗
B
2 ;xA, xB
´
= 0 and ∂
2g
∂(tk)2
³
t∗A+t
∗
B
2 ;xA, xB
´
< 0. But this implies that candidate
B would be strictly better off both by spending more time on issue k (if possible) and less time
on this issue (if possible). Since at least one of these options (increasing or decreasing the time
spent on issue k) is available for candidate B, this contradicts the fact that t∗B is a best response
against t∗A.
Assume now, by contradiction again, that (t∗A, t
∗
B) is an equilibrium with
¡
t∗kA , t
∗k
B
¢
= (0, 0).
Since not speaking on issue k is a best response for candidate A against candidate B not addressing
the issue, it must be the case that there exists some ε > 0 such that
∂g
∂tk
Ã
t∗1A + t
∗1
B
2
, ...,
t∗k−1A + t
∗k−1
B
2
, tk,
t∗k+1A + t
∗k+1
B
2
, ...,
t∗KA + t
∗K
B
2
;xA, xB
!
< 0 for tk ∈ [0, ε] .
But symmetrically, since not speaking on issue k is a best response for candidate B against
candidate A not addressing the issue, it must be the case that there exists some ε0 > 0 such that
∂g
∂tk
Ã
t∗1A + t
∗1
B
2
, ...,
t∗k−1A + t
∗k−1
B
2
, tk,
t∗k+1A + t
∗k+1
B
2
, ...,
t∗KA + t
∗K
B
2
;xA, xB
!
> 0 for tk ∈ [0, ε0] .
These conditions cannot simultaneously hold. Similarly, it cannot be the case that (t∗A, t
∗
B) is an
equilibrium with
¡
t∗kA , t
∗k
B
¢
= (1, 1).
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Proof of proposition 4. Assuming linear precision indices, for each issue k,
either ∂
2g
∂(tk)2
(t;xA, xB) < 0 for all t ∈ T , or ∂
2g
∂(tk)2
(t;xA, xB) > 0 for all t ∈ T . Denote by DRA
(as "Decreasing Relative marginal benefit of precision for party A") the set of issues such that
the former condition holds, and by IRA (as "Increasing Relative marginal benefit of precision for
party A") the set of issues such that the latter condition holds.
We prove the following two points, which will together yield the result in proposition 4.
Point 1. Party B addresses at most one issue in DRA.
Point 2. If party A speaks on one issue in IRA, then party B does not speak on this issue.
Proof of point 1: Given t∗A, B chooses its best response so as to minimize πA Under the global
time constraint faced by B, an argument similar to that given in point 2 of proposition 2 shows
that B addresses at most one issue for which it has increasing marginal benefit of speech (which
are exactly the issues in DRA).
Proof of point 2: Consider an issue k in IRA. For some fixed (t1, ..., tk−1, tk+1, ..., tK) ∈
[0, 1]K−1 and (xA, xB) ∈ R2, denote by gk : R → R, tk → g((t1, ..., tk−1, tk, tk+1, ..., tK);xA, xB).
Since issue k is in IRA, the function gk is convex. Let tk be the point in R at which the minimum
is reached. If tk ≤ 0, gk increases on [0, 1] and whatever the time spent on the issue by party A,
party B does not address issue k. Consider now cases where tk > 0. Note that gk decreases on
]0, tk]. At equilibrium, it cannot be the case that tkA/2 lies in the interval ]0, t
k]. Indeed, assume
by contradiction that A chooses tkA such that t
k
A/2 lies in ]0, t
k]. In that case, a best response by
party B entails that either B does not speak on issue k or it speaks so as to decrease gk at most up
to the point where tk is reached. But then party A would be strictly better off by not addressing
the issue at all. Indeed, whatever the value reached by gk when B plays a best response against
tA with tkA/2 in ]0, t
k], it will "cost" party B more time to reach the same outcome on gk if A
does not address issue k. Since time is valuable, it shows that either A does not speak on issue k,
or A chooses a time tkA such that t
k
A/2 ≥ tk. In the case where tkA/2 ≥ tk, B faces an increasing
gk (since gk is increasing for any tk larger than larger tk) and B is better off not speaking.
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